FOUR years ago Mitt Romney, then a Republican candidate, said that Russia was America’s “number-one geopolitical foe”. Barack Obama, among others, mocked this hilarious gaffe: “The 1980s are now calling to ask for their foreign policy back, because the cold war’s been over for 20 years,” scoffed the president. How times change. With Russia hacking the American election, presiding over mass slaughter in Syria, annexing Crimea and talking casually about using nuclear weapons, Mr Romney’s view has become conventional wisdom. Almost the only American to dissent from it is today’s Republican nominee, Donald Trump.
Every week Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, finds new ways to scare the world. Recently he moved nuclear-capable missiles close to Poland and Lithuania. This week he sent an aircraft-carrier group down the North Sea and the English Channel. He has threatened to shoot down any American plane that attacks the forces of Syria’s despot, Bashar al-Assad. Russia’s UN envoy has said that relations with America are at their tensest in 40 years. Russian television news is full of ballistic missiles and bomb shelters. “Impudent behaviour” might have “nuclear consequences”, warns Dmitry Kiselev, Mr Putin’s propagandist-in-chief—who goes on to cite Mr Putin’s words that “If a fight is inevitable, you have to strike first.”
In fact, Russia is not about to go to war with America. Much of its language is no more than bluster. But it does pose a threat to stability and order. And the first step to answering that threat is to understand that Russian belligerence is not a sign of resurgence, but of a chronic, debilitating weakness.
Vlad the invader
As our special report this week sets out, Russia confronts grave problems in its economy, politics and society. Its population is ageing and is expected to shrink by 10% by 2050. An attempt to use the windfall from the commodity boom to modernise the state and its economy fell flat. Instead Mr Putin has presided over a huge increase in government: between 2005 and 2015, the share of Russian GDP that comes from public spending and state-controlled firms rose from 35% to 70%. Having grown by 7% a year at the start of Mr Putin’s reign, the economy is now shrinking. Sanctions are partly to blame, but corruption and a fall in the price of oil matter more. The Kremlin decides who gets rich and stays that way. Vladimir Yevtushenkov, a Russian tycoon, was detained for three months in 2014. When he emerged, he had surrendered his oil company.
Mr Putin has sought to offset vulnerability at home with aggression abroad. With their mass protests after election-rigging in 2011-12, Russia’s sophisticated urban middle classes showed that they yearn for a modern state. When the oil price was high, Mr Putin could resist them by buying support. Now he shores up his power by waging foreign wars and using his propaganda tools to whip up nationalism. He is wary of giving any ground to Western ideas because Russia’s political system, though adept at repression, is brittle. Institutions that would underpin a prosperous Russia, such as the rule of law, free media, democracy and open competition, pose an existential threat to Mr Putin’s rotten state.
For much of his time in office Mr Obama has assumed that, because Russia is a declining power, he need not pay it much heed. Yet a weak, insecure, unpredictable country with nuclear weapons is dangerous—more so, in some ways, even than the Soviet Union was. Unlike Soviet leaders after Stalin, Mr Putin rules alone, unchecked by a Politburo or by having witnessed the second world war’s devastation. He could remain in charge for years to come. Age is unlikely to mellow him.
Mr Obama increasingly says the right things about Putinism—he sounded reasonably tough during a press conference this week—but Mr Putin has learned that he can defy America and come out on top. Mild Western sanctions make ordinary Russians worse off, but they also give the people an enemy to unite against, and Mr Putin something to blame for the economic damage caused by his own policies.
Ivan the bearable
What should the West do? Time is on its side. A declining power needs containing until it is eventually overrun by its own contradictions—even as the urge to lash out remains.
Because the danger is of miscalculation and unchecked escalation, America must continue to engage in direct talks with Mr Putin even, as today, when the experience is dispiriting. Success is not measured by breakthroughs and ceasefires—welcome as those would be in a country as benighted as Syria—but by lowering the chances of a Russian blunder.
Nuclear miscalculation would be the worst kind of all. Hence the talks need to include nuclear-arms control as well as improved military-to-military relations, in the hope that nuclear weapons can be kept separate from other issues, as they were in Soviet times. That will be hard because, as Russia declines, it will see its nuclear arsenal as an enduring advantage.
Another area of dispute will be Russia’s near abroad. Ukraine shows how Mr Putin seeks to destabilise countries as a way to stop them drifting out of Russia’s orbit (see article). America’s next president must declare that, contrary to what Mr Trump has said, if Russia uses such tactics against a NATO member, such as Latvia or Estonia, the alliance will treat it as an attack on them all. Separately the West needs to make it clear that, if Russia engages in large-scale aggression against non-NATO allies, such as Georgia and Ukraine, it reserves the right to arm them.
Above all the West needs to keep its head. Russian interference in America’s presidential election merits measured retaliation. But the West can withstand such “active measures”. Russia does not pretend to offer the world an attractive ideology or vision. Instead its propaganda aims to discredit and erode universal liberal values by nurturing the idea that the West is just as corrupt as Russia, and that its political system is just as rigged. It wants to create a divided West that has lost faith in its ability to shape the world. In response, the West should be united and firm.
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Contending with Putin's Russia:
Proposals for a New Approach
by David J. Kramer and Susan Corke
As the administration of President Barack Obama prepares for various foreign policy challenges in its second term, a new approach to dealing with Vladimir Putin’s Russia should be on the agenda. Since his formal return to the presidency in May of last year, Putin has overseen the worst deterioration in Russia’s democracy and human rights situation since the collapse of the Soviet Union and is attempting to reestablish a fear of dissent in society. The Russian government’s malign influence also extends beyond the country’s borders, as it has propped up authoritarian systems ranging from that of Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka to the murderous Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad.
Attention to the Russia problem should not translate into undue attention to Putin himself. As the leader of a major power, he cannot be totally ignored, but U.S. and allied leaders should not lend him undeserved legitimacy or invest much time with him. Personalizing the policy approach to Russia under Putin, as President Obama did through his first-term “reset” with Putin’s stand-in, Dmitry Medvedev, will neither advance U.S. interests and values nor strengthen the forces in Russia that seek a more democratic future. Putin never appeared to buy into the reset policy and instead plays the anti-Americanism card whenever it is politically expedient. A democratic Russia, fully integrated into the international community, would be an important contributor to global security and stability. But as long as Putin remains in office, Russia may be incapable of realizing that vision.
Before devising a new approach to dealing with Putin’s Russia, policymakers must first understand the nature of the problem—namely, Putinism. Over the past year, driven by a fear that the democratic spirit of the Arab awakening would creep toward Russia, Putin and his adherents have launched a series of initiatives designed to close down civil society and eliminate any and all potential threats to his grip on power. New legislation has been crafted to increase criminal penalties for opposition protesters, censor and control the internet, taint nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that receive overseas funding as “foreign agents,” prohibit U.S. funding of Russian NGOs involved in “political activities,” drastically expand the definition of treason, and recriminalize libel and slander. Arrests, arbitrary detentions, and home raids targeting opposition figures are occurring on a level not seen since Soviet times. One opposition figure was even kidnapped from Kyiv, where he was seeking asylum, and brought back to Russia to be prosecuted based on a coerced confession. A Putin critic living in Britain, Aleksandr Perepilichny, died under mysterious circumstances last November, recalling the poisoning death of Aleksandr Litvinenko in 2006. Also during 2012, the Russian government forced the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) out of the country; the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute soon followed. The legal and practical space for civil society and political opposition in Russia is closing quickly.
It is worth noting that none of these actions represent a radical departure from the Putin regime’s past behavior. The government has long restricted its citizens’ rights and freedoms by holding stage-managed elections and increasing control over the media, particularly television. Civil society and Putin’s political opponents have been under duress for many years, with an escalation in state pressure coming in the wake of the “color revolutions” in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004). And tactics like spy mania and anti-Americanism, seen most recently in the spiteful adoption ban in December, have regularly been deployed to divert attention from atrocious governance failures and foster nationalist support for the thoroughly corrupt Russian leadership. The population bears the costs of such policies.
Moreover, the Russian government’s more aggressive behavior of late should not be misread as a sign that Putin’s position is stronger than before. At heart, his recent actions represent a paranoid and compensatory response to the understanding that the system he built is growing increasingly vulnerable. The Kremlin is determined to thwart democratic uprisings anywhere in the world because each event thins the protective global herd of dictators and is potentially transferable to Russia itself. At the same time, Putin’s personal behavior is becoming more erratic, with stunts ranging from his flight with Siberian cranes in September to his public embrace of disgraced French actor Gérard Depardieu. Mounting speculation about his health is chipping away at Putin’s image as a vibrant, invincible leader, and his poll numbers are steadily declining.
Since the mass protests that spanned the period between the December 2011 parliamentary elections and Putin’s inauguration last spring, the regime’s ability to keep a lid on dissent has been sorely challenged. Surveys show that an increasing number of Russians, especially the younger generation, are interested in emigrating from the country. They are fed up with daily corruption and a stagnant political outlook that was exacerbated by Putin’s decision in September 2011 to return to the presidency. Many Russians simply cannot bear the prospect of another two six-year presidential terms with an aging Putin at the helm. Public support for the president has fallen below 50 percent in some recent surveys, and even lower in Moscow, while civic activism is on the rise. More than 100,000 Russians signed a petition on Novaya Gazeta’s website to oppose the U.S. adoption ban, and even several government ministers spoke against it. As Levada Center director Lev Gudkov recently stated, “This is a very stable trend: falling confidence, the declining legitimacy of the authorities.” The general sense of decay is reinforced by the warped, hydrocarbon-based economy, disintegrating infrastructure and social supports, and a long-term demographic decline.